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CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
Abstract 
 
Two studies used event-related potentials (ERPs) to examine whether and how divergent 
thinking and creative achievement are linked to attentional flexibility and cognitive 
control as indexed by response times and by the amplitude of the anterior N2 ERP 
component. Both experiments used an oddball paradigm in which participants viewed 
hierarchical letter stimuli and identified target letters in frequent and rare target trials. The 
successful identification of targets required attentional flexibility when switching levels 
of attention (from the frequent global to the rare local attentional level, or vice-versa). 
Divergent thinkers showed smaller switching times on rare target trials, indicating higher 
levels of attentional flexibility. Furthermore, divergent thinkers engaged cognitive control 
processes more strongly at the moment of the attentional switch (and before the 
response), as indicated by a larger N2 difference between frequent and rare targets. In 
contrast, creative achievement was associated with neither the switching times on rare 
target trials, nor with a larger N2 difference between frequent and rare targets. All results 
held when controlling for general intelligence. Results from these studies provide 
evidence that divergent thinking is associated with higher attentional flexibility and that 
such attentional flexibility relies on cognitive control processes required when 
disengaging from one level of attention (e.g., global), and shifting to the other level of 
attention (e.g., local). 
 






































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
1. Introduction 
 
Creativity, like many mental activities, requires attention, but what form of 
attention is most conducive to creativity remains unresolved. The existing literature 
provides contradictory accounts on the link between creativity and attention, suggesting 
that creativity is linked with broad attention (Ansburg & Hill, 2003), “leaky” attention, 
i.e., attention that allows “irrelevant” information to be noticed (Kasof, 1997; Zabelina, 
Saporta, & Beeman, 2016), attentional flexibility (Vartanian, Martindale, & 
Kwiatkowski, 2007; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010), and executive control, which relies 
heavily on the ability to focus attention (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). Recent advances in 
the field, however, are beginning to elucidate these seemingly contradictory accounts by 
pointing to the crucial importance of distinguishing between the various operational 
definitions of creativity. 
One of the most common ways of operationally defining creativity is through the 
performance on the Alternate Uses (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) or divergent thinking tests 
(Goff & Torrance, 2002; Torrance, 1974). Both alternate uses and divergent thinking 
tests are aimed at assessing people’s ability to generate multiple original uses for a 
common object or novel solutions to a stated problem within a limited amount of time in 
a laboratory setting (although the nature of the tests and instructions can vary). 
Participants are typically instructed to be creative, and are given 2-3 minutes to generate 
their creative ideas, with responses scored for fluency (i.e., number of pertinent responses 
within the allotted time), and originality of responses (i.e., how novel or original the 
participant’s responses are compared to the responses within the experimental sample or 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
prepotent, uncreative response tendencies and involves cognitive strategies to arrive at 
novel ideas (Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007). 
An increasing body of research suggests that creativity, operationalized with 
divergent thinking tests, tends to involve top-down control of attention (sometimes in 
combination with more spontaneous, undirected cognitive processes; Beaty, Silvia, 
Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014). Most of this evidence comes from latent variable 
studies showing effects of higher-order cognitive abilities, such as working memory 
capacity ( ee &  herriault, 2013;   β, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, &  chulze, 2002), 
verbal fluency (Benedek, Bergner, Könen, Fink, & Neubauer, 2011; Silvia, Beaty, & 
Nusbaum, 2013), and fluid intelligence (Beaty, et al., 2014; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). 
Such abilities are hypothesized to support thinking in a divergent manner by providing 
the executive control needed to guide memory retrieval and inhibit salient, but unoriginal 
ideas (Beaty & Silvia, 2012). 
Behavioral evidence for the role of executive processes in performance on the 
divergent thinking tasks has also received support from electroencephalography (EEG) 
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research. Studies report task-related 
activation in brain regions associated with interference resolution, response selection, and 
cognitive control in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and inferior parietal cortex (Abraham, 
Beudt, Ott, & Cramon, 2012; Chrysikou & Thompson-Schill, 2011; Fink et al., 2009; 
Fink & Benedek, 2014). Divergent thinking has also been linked with more selective (in 
contrast to “leaky”) sensory filters that are reflected in the P50 ERP (Zabelina,  eary, 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
Our prior work suggests that divergent thinking is linked with flexible attention, 
the mechanism for which may indeed be the ability to focus, inhibit, and switch attention, 
i.e., higher levels of cognitive control (Zabelina et al., 2016). In this study, participants 
were asked to identify target letters (S or H) within classic hierarchical stimuli (global 
letters made of local letters; Navon, 1977). On most trials, participants were correctly 
cued to the level of the target (80% valid trials) but, critically, they were given invalid 
cues on a subset of trials (20% invalid trials). Thus, we were able to operationalize 
attentional flexibility by using well-established stimuli in attention research. Results 
showed that people with higher divergent thinking scores were quicker to overcome the 
invalid cues to correctly identify the target, thus showing more attentional flexibility. 
We further investigated the mechanism for attentional flexibility in divergent 
thinkers, by suggesting that there are at least two competing mechanisms through which 
attentional flexibility can be achieved. One proposed mechanism is “leaky attention,” 
such that when cued to one level of a stimulus, some information is still processed, or 
“leaks in,” from the non-cued level. Thus we designed an experiment in which we again 
presented participants with the hierarchical letters, however in this case the cued stimulus 
level always contained a target, and the non-cued level was congruent, neutral, or 
incongruent with the target. Participants were asked to identify the target at the cued 
level, and the cue was always valid. The congruency effect (response times on 
incongruent compared to the congruent trials) was the measure of “leaky” attention. We 
found that divergent thinking did not relate to the congruency effect, suggesting that 
“leaky” attention is not the mechanism for attentional flexibility in divergent thinkers. 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
attention, or higher levels of cognitive control, is likely the mechanism by which 
divergent thinkers achieve attentional flexibility while switching levels of attention. The 
present study directly examined this hypothesis by investigating whether cognitive 
control is the mechanism by which divergent thinkers achieve attentional flexibility when 
switching levels of attention. 
 In contrast to operationally defining creativity with the laboratory tests of 
divergent thinking, a more ecologically valid way of assessing people’s creativity is by 
asking them about their real-life creative accomplishments. Admittedly, the creative 
process of writing a piece of literature or engineering a novel design is distinct from and 
occurs on a longer timeline than a 2-3-minute laboratory test of divergent thinking. 
Indeed, correlations between divergent thinking and real-world creativity generally vary 
considerably, suggesting that they involve some unique processes (Runco & Acar, 2012; 
Torrance, 1969). While real-world creativity may indeed rely on the ability to think in a 
divergent manner, it may also reflect other factors, such as incubation of ideas (the 
opportunity that is severely limited on the divergent thinking tests), as well as 
persistence, opportunity, personality, and resources. 
 Unlike the link between divergent thinking and attentional flexibility, real-life 
creativity tends to be associated with “leaky” attention. For example, latent inhibition, or 
a reduced ability to screen or inhibit from conscious awareness stimuli previously 
experienced as irrelevant, relates to creative achievement (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 
2003). Similarly, people with higher number of real-life creative accomplishments tend to 
exhibit higher levels of “leaky” attention when asked to identify target letters within 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
by the P50 ERP (Zabelina et al., 2015).  uch perceptual openness, or “open- 
mindedness” as the literature suggests (Feist, 1998), may enhance creativity by enlarging 
the range of unfiltered stimuli available in conscious awareness, thereby increasing the 
possibility that novel and useful combinations of stimuli will be synthesized. It is 
possible, however, that leaky attention underlies both costs and benefits of creative 
cognition: noise and other environmental stimuli can serve as distractors for creative 
people, leading to heightened distractibility, as well as to predisposition for attention 
disorders and various forms of psychopathology (Boot, Nevicka, & Baas, 2917; Zabelina, 
Condon, & Beeman, 2014 ). At the same time, leaky attention may help people integrate 
ideas that are outside the focus of attention into their current information processing, 
leading to creative thinking. 
 In summary, creativity assessed with divergent thinking tests or through a survey 
of people’s real-life creative accomplishments tends to relate to distinct forms of 
attention. People who perform well on laboratory tests of divergent thinking exhibit more 
attentional flexibility, while people with more real-life creative accomplishments show 
more “leaky” attention. Although we have previously noted that cognitive control is 
likely the mechanism through which divergent thinkers achieve attentional flexibility 
(Zabelina et al., 2016), the evidence for it remains to be examined. Moreover, while real-
life creativity does not appear to relate to attentional flexibility, it is possible that creative 
achievement is also linked with higher levels of cognitive control, as it has been posited 
that “leaky” attention, in combination with higher levels of cognitive control, leads to the 
highest levels of real-life creative accomplishments (Carson, 2011; Zabelina, in press). 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
from becoming overwhelmed by the incoming sensory information, while helping them 
funnel it in appropriate ways. 
The goal of the present work was to investigate the role of attention and cognitive 
control in creativity.  
We examined whether and how divergent thinking and creative achievement 
relate to attentional flexibility as indexed by response times, and to cognitive control as 
indexed by the N2 event–related potential (ERP) in an oddball paradigm. In this 
paradigm, rare (and thus unexpected) changes in a stream of otherwise uniform stimuli 
require one to update internal representations of the ongoing stimulus sequence and to 
reorient attention, providing a way to assess attentional flexibility. A number of studies 
using variants of this paradigm have indicated that a family of frontocentral N2 
components (which we will refer to as “N2 components” hereafter, for simplicity) is 
related, among other things, to cognitive control– namely, response inhibition, response 
conflict, and error monitoring (for review, see Folstein & Van Patten, 2008).  
It has been debated whether the N2 component reflects inhibition (Falkenstein, 
Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999) or conflict monitoring processes (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, 
Van Den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003), but both of these interpretations are 
consistent with the N2 serving as an index of cognitive control processes. In line with this 
interpretation, dipole-modeling work suggests that the N2 can be localized to the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), a neural structure known to play a key role in cognitive control 
(Nieuwenhuis et al, 2003; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004).  
In oddball paradigms, anterior N2 components to targets are often observed in 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
contextual and memory updating processes, such as the revising of working memory 
templates (Debener, Makeig, Delorme, & Engel, 2005; Spencer, Dien, & Donchin, 1999, 
2001). The P3b is a task-relevant potential elicited during target stimulus processing 
(Snyder & Hillyard, 1976), and is distinguished from a P3a task-irrelevant potential 
(Polich, 1988). Although we examined the P3b, because the goal of this paper was to 
investigate the relationship between creativity and cognitive control, we did not have any 
predictions regarding the link between creativity and this component. 
While a number of studies have used electroencephalogram (EEG) methodology 
to investigate creative cognition (for review, see Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Srinivasa, 
2007), few have attempted to link any component related to ERPs with creative thinking. 
Exceptions include studies on insight problem solving (e.g., Lang Kanngieser, Jaśkowski, 
Haider, Rose, & Verleger,  2006; Lavric, Frostmerier, & Rippon, 2000; Luo et al., 2011; 
Qiu et al., 2008), and an examination of conceptual expansion (Rutter, Kröger, Hill, 
Windmann, Herman, & Abraham, 2012). To our knowledge this is the first investigation 
linking creativity to the N2 ERP. 
Experiment 1 was preliminary in nature, and was conducted in order to evaluate 
the feasibility of the proposed project, and confirm the time windows and electrode sites 
of interests for the ERP analyses. We assessed divergent thinkers’ attentional flexibility 
by comparing their response times on rare and frequent target trials (that is, response time 
when switching attention from the local to the global attentional level, or vice versa), and 
by determining whether such attentional flexibility is accompanied by increased 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
Experiment 1 by using a larger sample and by also measuring real-life creative 
achievement and intelligence scores.  
In both experiments people viewed hierarchical letter stimuli (global-local letters, 
Navon, 1977) in blocks of trials, and they had to detect a target letter provided at the 
beginning of each block. Eighty percent of the trials (frequent target trials) occurred at 
one attention level (e.g., global), 10% of the trials (rare target trials) occurred at the other 
level (e.g., local), and the remaining 10% contained no target and were used as control. 
Thus, when performing this task, participants pay attention to target letters that appear at 
the most frequent level (.e.g., global), but occasionally, they need to detect letters that 
appear at the other level (e.g., local). This feature of the oddball task is what enabled us 
to assess attentional flexibility, that is, the ability to switch between different attentional 
levels. As done in our previous work (Zabelina et al., 2016), we assessed each person’s 
capacity for attentional flexibility by computing their behavioral oddball effect: how 
much longer they took to respond to the rare compared to the frequent targets. Cognitive 
control is one of the mechanisms by which attentional flexibility may be achieved, and so 
we assessed each person’s levels of cognitive control engagement by computing the same 
measure for N2 amplitude (N2 oddball effect), as suggested by prior ERP work (Folstein 
& Van Patten, 2008). Finally, we assessed the engagement of contextual and memory 
updating processes by computing the same measure for P3b amplitude (P3b oddball 
effect).  
Given prior literature, we expected that people with higher divergent thinking 
scores would show a smaller behavioral oddball effect, indicating better attentional 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
achieve attentional flexibility when switching levels of attention, we also expected to see 
a larger N2 oddball effect (as increased cognitive control engagement is reflected in 
larger N2 amplitudes). Alternatively, if cognitive control is not the mechanism by which 
divergent thinkers achieve attentional flexibility, we should see no relationship between 





2.1. Participants and design 
 Participants included 15 (5 male, 10 female, mean age = 19.4, SD = 1.0) 
University of Plymouth students who took part in the study for course credit. Two 
participants were not included in the analyses because of incomplete datasets due to 
technical issues. None of the participants had a history of epilepsy, neurological, 
psychiatric, or psychological disorders, learning disability, current or history of drug, 
alcohol, or substance abuse, head trauma, concussion, or loss of consciousness of 
substantial duration (minutes or more). None of the participants were taking any 
potentially psychoactive medication, or had an untreated health problems that may affect 
cognitive function (e.g., high blood pressure, diabetes). All participants were either fluent 
English speakers or learned English before 5 years of age, and all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. The study was approved by the University of Plymouth 
Ethics Board and all participants reviewed and signed a consent form. 
 The study was correlational in nature, with divergent thinking, attentional 
flexibility (RT), and cognitive control (N2) as the variables of interest.  
 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
2.2.1. Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA; Goff &Torrance, 2002) 
To assess divergent thinking, participants completed the ATTA – a shortened 
form of the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974). The ATTA consists of 
three activities (3 min each), one involving verbal (written) responses (e.g., generating 
problems that may arise from being able to walk on air or fly without being in an airplane 
or a similar vehicle), and two involving figural responses (e.g., using incomplete figures 
to make pictures). Responses were scored for fluency (i.e., a count of the number of 
pertinent responses), and originality (i.e., the number of responses that are not typically 
produced, according to the normative data), with scores summed across the three 
activities (Goff & Torrance, 2002). The total divergent thinking score reflects a weighted 
score of fluency plus two times originality, to equally weigh the two scores, since the 
average fluency score (14.5) was approximately double the average of the originality 
score (8.4), similar to the norms reported by the test developers (Goff & Torrance, 2002; 
see Runco & Acar, 2012 for suggestions on scoring divergent thinking tests). The ATTA 
reports good reliability (KR-21 = .84; Goff & Torrance, 2002). The average divergent 
thinking score was 31.4 (SD = 11.35, range 14-50). 
2.2.3. Oddball task 
We adapted the Local-Global letter task (Navon, 1977) to optimally test for the 
oddball effect. The stimuli were Navon figures (Navon, 1977), and were designed so that 
global and local stimuli would elicit approximately equal response speed and accuracy 
based on a previous study (Bultitude, Rafal, & List, 2009). The stimuli consisted of 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
visual angle) were arranged within an invisible 5 x 4 rectangular grid to form the global 
letters (subtending approximately 1.5 by 3 degrees of visual angle). 
Participants were instructed to press one of two keys on a button box with their 
dominant hand to indicate whether a target letter was present or not. Participants were 
asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. After 9 practice trials there 
were 8 blocks of experimental trials, each with 60 stimuli presented in pseudo-random 
order. Before each block, a single red letter (twice in size as the local letters) in the center 
of the screen indicated the target letter to be detected in the upcoming block. Each 
stimulus was presented in the center of the screen for 700 ms, with an average inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) of 2500 ms, randomly varying between 2400 and 2600 ms (to 
minimize effects of temporal expectation). Targets could occur at either the local or the 
global attentional level. In each block, 80 % of trials (48 trials) contained targets at one 
attentional level (frequent), 10% (6 trials) contained a target at the other attentional level 
(rare), and the remaining 10% (6 trials) contained no target (Figure 1B).  
 
2.2.4.  Electrophysiological recordings  
The EEG was sampled at 8192 Hz using a Biosemi Active Two system. EEG data 
were collected from 32 active Ag/AgCl electrodes arranged according to the 10–20 
system, and loose lead electrodes (Ultra Flat Active electrodes, Biosemi) below the right 
eye, to monitor eye blinks and vertical eye movements, and on the left and right mastoids. 
Horizontal eye movements were monitored using 2 loose electrodes placed on the outer 
canthi of the right and left eyes. The data were downsampled off-line to 512 Hz before 
further processing. Data were re-referenced off-line to the average of the two mastoids 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
2.2.5. ERP waveform and component analysis 
 EEGLab and ERPLab were used to conduct offline EEG analyses (Delorme & 
Makeig, 2004; Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014). ERPs were averaged off-line for an 
epoch of 1000 ms, including a 200 ms baseline. Trials contaminated by blinks, eye 
movements, muscle activity or amplifier blocking were rejected off-line. Although the 
figures show data low-pass filtered at 30Hz (to avoid visually distracting high frequency 
noise in the plots), all analyses were conducted on unfiltered data. 
As with fMRI, with ERP analyses there is the risk of circularity if one uses a 
dataset to define time windows and scalp sites to measure the amplitude of ERP 
components in that same dataset. Thus, we used information about the frontal N2 and the 
P3b from the literature and from visual inspection of these components in Experiment 1 
to define the time windows and sites of interest. These temporal and spatial parameters 
were then also used to measure the amplitude of these components in the independent 
dataset for Experiment 2. N2 and P3b amplitudes were measured at sites Fz/Cz (mean 
value between 350 and 450 ms) and Pz (mean value between 500 and 700 ms), 
respectively, where they usually are maximal (Folstein & Van Patten, 2008 for N2; 
Polich, 2009 for P3b). For the N2, data from sites Fz and Cz were combined to provide 
more robust single-subject averages. 
 For each participant, we computed the final N2 (P3b) oddball effect by 
subtracting N2 (P3b) amplitudes on the frequent target trials from the N2 (P3b) 
amplitudes on the rare target trials. Since the N2 is a negative-going potential, larger 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
frequent target trials. Conversely, since the P3b is a positive-going potential, larger 
positive values of the difference indicate a P3b with greater amplitude.  
2.3. Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually during a session lasting approximately 90 
minutes. During this session, participants were administered a divergent thinking test and 
an oddball task using the Navon figures during which the EEG was recorded 
continuously. For the oddball task, after setting up the EEG cap and electrodes, 
participants were seated on a comfortable chair, 115 cm from a computer screen in a dark 
room. They were asked to relax and to refrain from blinking during the presentation of 
the stimuli, but otherwise blink naturally in between trials.  
2.4. Analytical strategy 
First, differences in RTs for rare target, frequent target, and no target trials were 
examined with an ANOVA and follow-up t-tests. Next, t-tests were conducted to 
compare the amplitude of the N2 and P3b components to rare and frequent targets 
(oddball effect). Finally, linear regressions were carried out to determine whether 
divergent thinking scores (total scores, as well as fluency and originality scores 
separately) predicted the RT, N2, or P3b oddball effects. 
 
3. Results 
Two participants were outliers with average RTs larger than 2.5 standard 
deviation of the mean in at least one trial type, and so they were excluded from the 
analyses. Normality checks were carried out on residuals, which were approximately 
normally distributed. Mauchly's Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had not been violated, χ
2



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
A repeated measure ANOVA on the 11 participants with complete datasets 
showed that mean RT differed between the three types of trials [F(2,20) = 119.69, p < 
.001]. Post hoc analysis using Bonferroni correction revealed that participants responded 
faster to frequent target (M = 524 ms, SE = 20.41) than to rare target trials (M = 697 ms, 
SE = 40.60, p < .001). Participants also responded faster to frequent target (M = 524 ms, 
SE = 20.41) than to no targets trials (M = 848, SE = 42.14, p < .001). Finally, they also 
responded faster to rare target than to no target trials (p < .001, Figure 2). Because in a 
typical two-stimulus oddball paradigm rare and frequent trials are compared (see Folstein 
& Van Patten, 2008), further analyses focused on the oddball effect calculated as the 
difference between the rare and frequent targets (for RTs, N2, and P3b amplitudes). 
The ERPs elicited by the rare targets included a frontocentral N2 followed by a 
parietal P3b (Figure 3). No obvious P3a component was observed in this dataset (for 
review, see Polich, 2007).  he N2 was 1.1 μV larger (i.e., more negative) for rare than for 
frequent targets [t(10) = 3.24, p = .009]. There was a positive but non-significant 
correlation between the RT and N2 oddball effects (r = .45, p = .16).  he P3b was 3.9 μV 
larger (i.e., more positive) for rare than for frequent targets [t(11) = 4.11, p = .002] 
(Figure 3). 
3.1. Divergent thinking, attention, and cognitive control 
 
Our primary hypothesis was that people with higher divergent thinking scores (as 
measured by the ATTA) would exhibit more attentional flexibility, as indexed by a 
smaller RT oddball effect, accompanied by increased cognitive control engagement, 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
As predicted, higher total divergent thinking scores were associated with a smaller 
RT oddball effect (r = -.64, p = .034, Figure 4). This effect was significant for fluency (r 
= -.61, p = .046), and there was a trend towards significance for originality (r = -.54, p = 
.09) of divergent thinking.  
 Further, higher total divergent thinking was associated with a larger N2 oddball 
effect (r = -.67, p = .024). This effect was significant for originality (r = -.68, p =.021), 
but not for fluency (r = -38, p =.25) of divergent thinking.  
There was no significant correlation between divergent thinking and the P3b 
oddball effect (r = -.31, p = .35). 
 
4. Discussion  
These results indicate that people with higher divergent thinking scores were 
more flexible when switching levels of attention, as evident by the smaller RT oddball 
effect. Flexible switching was accompanied by the larger N2 oddball effects in divergent 
thinkers, indicating increased cognitive control engagement at the moment of the 
attentional switch. 
Experiment 1 was exploratory in nature, and although the sample size was small, 
it provided preliminary evidence that cognitive control may be the mechanism for 
attentional flexibility in divergent thinking. Experiment 2 included a larger scale 
replication of Experiment 1, and also examined the link between cognitive control and 
real-life creative achievement. Because of the potential link between intelligence and 
creativity (Silvia, 2015 for review), we included a test of general intelligence (WASI; 
Wechsler, 1999) as a covariate (FSIQ-4 scores). To be specific, intelligence measures are 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
or divergent thinking tests (e.g., Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011), but not with real-life 
creativity.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 tested the relationship between divergent thinking, real-life creative 
achievement, attentional flexibility, and cognitive control. Participants completed the 
same oddball task as in Experiment 1, as well as a divergent thinking test, a survey about 
their real-life creative accomplishments, and an intelligence test. Considering the results 
of Experiment 1, we expected that people with higher divergent thinking scores would be 
more flexible in their attention, as indexed by a smaller RT oddball effect. Additionally, 
we expected that higher divergent thinking would be associated with increased levels of 
cognitive control, indicated by a larger N2 oddball effect.  
As for creativity operationalized with a more ecologically-valid survey of 
people’s real-life creative accomplishments, there are two alternate hypotheses. If 
creative achievement is indeed linked with higher levels of cognitive control, we should 
see a positive association between creative achievement and the size of the N2 oddball 
effect. Alternately, if real-life creative achievement is not associated with cognitive 
control, we should see no relationship between creative achievement and the size of the 




5.1. Participants  
Participants included 39 (10 male, 29 female, mean age = 20.2, SD = 1.8) 
University of Plymouth students who took part in the study for course credits. Four 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
technical issues. All participation criteria were identical to the participation criteria in 
Experiment 1. The study was approved by the University of Plymouth Ethics Board, and 
all participants gave informed consent. 
5.2. Materials 
5.2.1. Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA; Goff & Torrance, 2002) 
Divergent thinking was assessed with the ATTA with the same instructions and 
scoring procedures as in Experiment 1. Mean divergent thinking score was 26.14 (SD = 
8.20, range 14-51). One participant’s score was larger than 3  D, and was Winsorized 
from 51 to the next largest value of 43. 
5.2.2. Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) 
Real-world creative behavior was assessed with the Creative Achievement 
Questionnaire in which participants catalogued their prior creative achievements across 
ten creative domains (visual art, music, dance, architectural design, creative writing, 
humor, inventions, scientific discovery, theater and film, and culinary arts). In the music 
domain, for example, questions range from “I have no training or recognized talent in this 
area” (score of 0) to “my compositions have been critiqued in a national publication” 
(score of 7). In the scientific discovery subset, scores vary from “I have no training or 
recognized ability in this field” (score of 0) to “my work has been cited by other scientists 
in national publications” (score of 7).  eparate domain scores were then combined to 
form a single index of creative achievement. The CAQ has excellent psychometric 
properties, including test-retest reliability (r = .81, p < .0001), internal consistency (α = 
.96), as well as good predictive, convergent, and discriminant validity (Carson et al., 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
scores were positively skewed, and so we used the signed log transformation to normalize 
the CAQ distribution.  
5.2.3. Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) 
Because factors related to intelligence likely influence scores on the divergent 
thinking test (Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy, & Neubauer, 2014; Nusbaum & Silvia, 
2011), we included WASI composite test scores as a variable in linear regression 
analyses predicting divergent thinking. The WASI is aimed at estimating intelligence 
scores rapidly, and it consists of four sub-tests, block design, vocabulary, matrix 
reasoning, and similarities, resulting in FSIQ-4 scores. The mean FSIQ-4 score was 119 
(SD = 8.1, range 104-140). 
5.2.4. Oddball Task 
The oddball task was identical to the oddball task used in Experiment 1, including 
the same stimuli as depicted in Figure 1. 
5.2.5.  Electrophysiological recordings and analyses  
The details of EEG recording and analyses were the same as for Experiment 1. 
5.3. Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually during a session lasting approximately 90 
minutes. During this session, participants were administered a divergent thinking test 
(ATTA), the Creative Achievement Questionnaire, and the oddball task, during which the 
EEG was recorded continuously. After the EEG session, participants were also 
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5.4. Analytical strategy 
First, differences in RTs for rare target, frequent target, and no target trials were 
examined with an ANOVA and follow-up t-tests. Second, t-tests were conducted to 
compare the amplitude of the N2 and P3b components to rare and frequent targets 
(oddball effect). Next, simple linear regression analyses were carried out to determine 
whether divergent thinking and creative achievement scores predicted the size of the 
oddball effects for RTs, the N2, and the P3b. Finally, corresponding multiple linear 
regression analyses were conducted to control for intelligence scores by also including 
FSIQ-4 scores as a predictor. 
6. Results 
Four participants had excessive eye movement artifacts and so they were not 
included in the ERP analyses (N = 31). However, they were included in the behavioral 
analyses (N = 35). Figure 5 shows the response time results. Normality checks were 
carried out on residuals, which were approximately normally distributed. Mauchly's Test 
of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated, χ
2
(2) = 
1.97, p = .37. 
A repeated measure ANOVA indicated that RTs differed between the three types 
of trials [F(2,68) = 195.23, p < .001]. Post hoc tests using Bonferroni correction revealed 
that participants responded faster to the frequent targets (M = 445 ms, SE = 9.62) 
compared to the rare targets (M = 596 ms, SE = 18.52, p < .001). Participants also 
responded faster to the frequent targets (M = 445 ms, SE = 9.62) compared to the trials 
with no target (M = 703, SE = 17.29, p < .001). Similarly, participants responded faster to 
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The ERPs were similar to those found in Experiment 1 and they showed a 
prominent frontal N2 followed by a parietal P3b (Figure 6). The N2 was 1.66 μV larger 
for rare than frequent targets [t(30) = 1.66, p = .005]. There was a trend for a positive 
correlation between the RT and N2 oddball effects (r = .32, p = .08).  he P3b was 6.3 μV 
larger for rare than for frequent targets [t(30) = 8.14, p < .0001]. 
 
6.1. Divergent thinking, attention, and cognitive control 
Our primary hypothesis was that people with higher divergent thinking scores (as 
measured by the ATTA) would exhibit higher levels of attentional flexibility as indexed 
by the smaller RT oddball effect, as well as higher cognitive control engagement, as 
indexed by the larger N2 oddball effect. As predicted, and replicating the results of 
Experiment 1, higher divergent thinking was associated with a smaller RT oddball effect 
(r = -.34, p = .047; Figure 6), with a trend towards significance for the association 
between the RT oddball effect and fluency (r = -.32, p = .06), but not originality (r = -.24, 
p = .16) of divergent thinking. Higher divergent thinking was still associated with a larger 
RT oddball effect after including FSIQ-4 scores in a multiple linear regression (r = -.35, p 
= .039). In this analysis, FSIQ-4 scores were not reliably associated with the RT oddball 
effect (r = .22, p = .18). 
Likewise, and replicating the results of Experiment 1, higher divergent thinking 
was associated with a larger N2 oddball effect (r = -.50, p = .004; Figure 7). This was 
true for both fluency (r = -.37, p = .04), and originality (r = -.44, p = .01) of divergent 
thinking. There was no correlation between divergent thinking and the P3b oddball effect 
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effect after including FSIQ-4 scores in a multiple linear regression (r = -.45, p = .005). In 
this analysis, FSIQ-4 scores were also associated with a larger N2 oddball effect (r = -.36, 
p = .024). Table 1 shows the Pearson correlation matrix between the ATTA (originality, 
fluency, and total), FSIQ-4, and CAQ scores. 
6.2. Creative achievement, attention, and cognitive control 
In contrast to divergent thinking, real-life creative achievement was associated 
with neither the RT oddball effect (r = .15, p = .40), nor the N2 oddball effect (r = -.29, p 
= .11), indicating no reliable link between creative achievement, attentional flexibility, or 
cognitive control. Furthermore, there was no correlation between real-life creative 
achievement and the P3b oddball effect (r = .03, p = .86). 
7. General Discussion  
The purpose of this investigation was to examine the role of cognitive control in 
creativity. We examined whether and how divergent thinking and creative achievement 
relate to attentional flexibility and cognitive control as indexed by the response times and 
by the N2 ERP amplitude in an oddball paradigm. Results from Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 demonstrate that people who perform better on the divergent thinking tests 
also exhibit more attentional flexibility, which is accompanied by increased cognitive 
control engagement at the moment of the attentional switch.  
In both experiments, people viewed hierarchical letter stimuli and identified target 
letters in frequent (80%) and rare (10%) trials. Successful identification of targets 
required attentional flexibility when switching levels of attention (from global to local 
attentional level, and vice-versa). Results showed that people with higher divergent 
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intelligence, indicating higher levels of attentional flexibility in divergent thinkers. This 
result is in line with our previous findings in a similar paradigm (Zabelina et al., 2016), 
where divergent thinking was also linked with attentional flexibility when switching 
levels of attention. We have suggested that cognitive control, or the ability to focus, 
inhibit, and switch attention, may be the mechanism for attentional flexibility in divergent 
thinkers. The results from both experiments confirm that divergent thinking is linked with 
higher levels of cognitive control at the moment of an attentional switch (and before the 
response), indicated by the larger N2 oddball effect, even when controlling for general 
intelligence. In other words, divergent thinkers recruit cognitive control processes more 
strongly when an attentional switch is required. 
To our knowledge this is the first account presenting neurophysiological evidence 
for the link between divergent thinking and the N2 oddball effect. Although no prior 
studies have investigated the N2 and its relationship with divergent thinking, insight 
studies have examined how N2 relates to insight in problem solving. Specifically, 
successful solutions of insight problems elicited a stronger N2 over left frontal areas (Qiu 
et al., 2008). The authors concluded that the higher N2 amplitude was critical for 
breaking mental set and to form new associations. Successful performance on divergent 
thinking tests arguably requires breaking of mental sets in order to abandon salient ideas 
and forming new associations in the service of identifying more original ideas. Further, 
considering the manner in which divergent thinking tests are administered (limited time, 
laboratory setting), higher levels of cognitive control appear to facilitate successful 
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provide support for the claim that thinking in a divergent manner relies on executive 
control more than previously thought (Benedek et al., 2014; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011).  
Further, we found a positive association between general intelligence as assessed 
with the WASI test and the N2 oddball effect. This in itself is a novel finding, and is 
consistent with a large body of literature reporting that the efficiency of cognitive control 
is the most likely determinant of intelligence (Chuderski & Nęcka, 2010 for review). 
Although some capacity for divergent thinking may be involved in real-life 
creativity, the two measures do not appear to relate to similar attentional or cognitive 
processes. Experiment 2 provided evidence that, in contrast to divergent thinking, real-
life creativity is not linked with either attentional flexibility (RT oddball effect) or 
cognitive control (N2 oddball effect) when switching levels of attention. Further, and 
contrary to prior reports, there was no association between general intelligence and 
creativity as assessed with the ATTA or the CAQ measures.   
Prior empirical investigations have suggested that creative achievement, rather 
than being associated with attentional flexibility, is linked with leaky attention (Carson et 
al., 2003; Zabelina et al., 2015; Zabelina et al., 2016). Because real-life creativity occurs 
on a longer time-scale than time-limited divergent thinking tests, attentional flexibility in 
some cases may even undermine real-life creative accomplishments. Indeed, since the 
time of Wallas (1926), immersion, i.e., extended preparation and thought, has been 
considered a critical stage of the creative process. Too much attentional flexibility may be 
harmful to the immersion stage of the creative process. Indeed, deep thinking has been 
found to increase task shielding, and reduce shifting flexibility (Fischer & Hommel, 
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modes of processing may promote successful creative problem solving (Wiley & Jarosz, 
2012), it appears that real-world creative acts may require a different form of attention.  
Although the ATTA and CAQ are accepted measures, their use leads to certain 
limitations in terms of the conclusions that can be drawn. The CAQ is a well-established 
measure, with high predictive validity against artist ratings of a creative product, and high 
convergent validity with other measures of creative potential (Carson et al., 2005), but it 
may not encompass some creative achievements that may be important to an individual 
(e.g., sports). In contrast, the ATTA is a more narrowly defined performance measure 
that theoretically contributes in part to creativity, and there is some evidence of the 
association between the ATTA and CAQ, though it is weak in our studies. Interpretations 
of the current work need to bear these caveats in mind when interpreting the results. 
Furthermore, the effect size in Experiment 1 should be interpreted with caution, as 
smaller sample sizes are likely to overestimate the size of the correlations. Given that our 
samples consisted of young psychology students, future studies will need to investigate 
the role of attention and cognitive control in creative professionals in various creative 
fields. Finally, our study was correlational in nature, and future studies will need to 
examine the causal role of attention and cognitive control in creativity.  
4.1. Conclusion 
We replicate previous behavioral findings that divergent thinking, but not real-
world creative achievement, is associated with greater attentional flexibility. Critically, 
we provide novel electrophysiological evidence that such greater attentional flexibility 
may rely on increased engagement of cognitive control processes indexed by the N2, 



































































CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
cognitive control engagement was found for creative achievement. These results confirm 
that these two creativity measures rely on different neural mechanisms and provide 
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Correlations Between ATTA (Ffluency, Originality, and Total), WASI, and CAQ Scores. 
In Parenthesis Are the p Values. 
 
  ATTA ORI ATTA TOT FSIQ-4 CAQ 
ATTA FLU .21 (.23) .64 (< .001) .23 (.18) .19 (.26) 
ATTA ORI  .87 (< .001) -.06 (.75) .27 (.12) 
ATTA TOT   .05 (.79) .27 (.12) 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1.  A): Stimuli consisted of twelve composite letters: an A made of es, ss, or hs; an 
E made of as, ss, or hs; an H made of es, ss, or as; and an S made of es, hs, or as.  B): 
Trial structure in the oddball task. In this example, participants were instructed to 
determine if the letter H was present (either at the global or local level, 80% and 10% of 
trials, respectively), or not (10% of trials). 
 
Figure 2.  Response times for frequent, rare, and no target trials in Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 3.  The left side of the figure shows grand-averaged ERPs (-200ms – 1000ms) to 
frequent and rare targets at central sites Fz, Cz, and Pz in Experiment 1 (N = 11). The N2 
and P3b components are indicated with arrows (left). The right side of the figure shows 
topographic maps for the N2 and P3b component (rare target condition).  The 
topographic map for the N2 is relative to the preceding positive component (150 – 250 
ms baseline) to emphasize that it is a negative-going component. Note that the biphasic 
potentials visible around 850 ms are due to stimulus offset.  
 
Figure 4.  Correlation between divergent thinking and the behavioral oddball effect in 
Experiment 1 (the RT difference between rare and frequent targets), showing that people 
with higher divergent thinking scores have more flexible attention. 
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Figure 6. The left side of the figure shows grand-averaged ERPs (-200ms – 800ms) to 
frequent and rare targets at central sites Fz, Cz, and Pz in Experiment 2 (N = 31). The N2 
and P3b components are indicated with arrows (left). The right side of the figure shows 
topographic maps for the N2 and P3b component (rare target condition).  The 
topographic map of the N2 is relative to the preceding positive component (150 – 250 ms 
baseline), to emphasize that it is a negative-going component. 
 
Figure 7. Correlation between divergent thinking and the RT oddball effect in 
Experiment 2 (the RT difference between rare and frequent targets), showing that people 
with higher divergent thinking scores have more flexible attention.  
 
Figure 8. Correlation between divergent thinking and the N2 oddball effect (N2 for rare 
targets minus frequent targets combining sites Fz and Cz within the 350-450 ms time 
window) in Experiment 2, showing that people with higher divergent thinking scores 
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